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Abstract—This paper presents a comprehensive survey of exist-
ing authentication and privacy-preserving schemes for 4G and 5G
cellular networks. We start by providing an overview of existing
surveys that deal with 4G and 5G communications, applications,
standardization, and security. Then, we give a classification of
threat models in 4G and 5G cellular networks in four categories,
including, attacks against privacy, attacks against integrity,
attacks against availability, and attacks against authentication.
We also provide a classification of countermeasures into three
types of categories, including, cryptography methods, humans
factors, and intrusion detection methods. The countermeasures
and informal and formal security analysis techniques used by the
authentication and privacy preserving schemes are summarized
in form of tables. Based on the categorization of the authenti-
cation and privacy models, we classify these schemes in seven
types, including, handover authentication with privacy, mutual
authentication with privacy, RFID authentication with privacy,
deniable authentication with privacy, authentication with mutual
anonymity, authentication and key agreement with privacy, and
three-factor authentication with privacy. In addition, we provide
a taxonomy and comparison of authentication and privacy-
preserving schemes for 4G and 5G cellular networks in form
of tables. Based on the current survey, several recommendations
for further research are discussed at the end of this paper.
Index Terms—Security, Privacy, Authentication, 5G mobile
communication, Cryptography.
I. INTRODUCTION
The fifth-generation mobile networks (5G) will soon super-
sede 4G in most countries of the world. The next generation
wireless network technology is being developed based on
recent advances in wireless and networking technologies such
as software-defined networking and virtualization. Compared
to 4G technologies, 5G is characterized by still higher bit
rates with more than 10 gigabits per second as well as by
more capacity and very low latency, which is a major asset for
the billions of connected objects in the context of Internet of
Things (IoT). In the IoT era, 5G will enable a fully mobile and
connected society, via creating various new network services
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TABLE I
THE LEADING PROJECTS FOR 5G
Time Company Program
2014 NTT DOCOMO and SK Telecom Ericsson 5G delivers 5 Gbps speeds [1]
2016 Ericsson and SoftBank Ericsson and SoftBank completed basic 5G trials on both 15 GHz and
4.5GHz spectrums [2]
2016 Ericsson and Telefónica Ericsson and Telefónica focused on the Advanced 5G Network In-
frastructure for Future Internet Public-Private Partnership (5G PPP)
and European Technology Platform for Communications Networks and
Services (ETP Networld 2020)
2016 Huawei and Vodafone Group plc Vodafone Group with Huawei have recently completed a 5G field test
in Newbury (UK) that demonstrates the capabilities of a trial system
operating at 70 GHz [3]
2017 Huawei and China Mobile Ltd. Huawei and China Mobile showcased the 5G 3.5GHz prototype and
Ka-Band millimeter wave prototype [4]
2017 Verizon Communications Inc. Verizon will begin pilot testing 5G "pre-commercial services" in U.S.
cities in the first half of 2017, including Atlanta, Dallas, Denver,
Houston, Miami, Seattle, and Washington [5]
2017 AT&T Inc. AT&T launches Nationwide LTE-M Network for Internet of Things [6]
2017 Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
Corporation (NTT)
Toyota and NTT collaborate to promote 5G standardization for auto-
motive vehicles [7]
2017 Huawei and Deutsche Telekom Huawei and Deutsche Telekom demonstrate the all Cloud 5G network
slicing [4]
Fig. 1. What will 5G enable?
such as mobile fog computing, car-to-car communications,
smart grid, smart parking, named data networking, blockchain
based services, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) etc. as shown
in Fig. 1. Therefore, telecommunications companies believe
that the commercialization of 5G will begin in 2020. In Tab.
I, we list some of the leading projects for 5G cellular networks
by various telecommunications companies.
In a 5G environment, the blend different wireless technolo-
gies and service providers that share an IP-based core network,
will offer the possibility to the mobile devices of switching be-
tween providers and technologies, for maintaining a high level
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2TABLE II
DEFINITIONS OF ACRONYMS AND NOTATIONS
Acronym Definition Acronym Definition
3GPP Third Generation Partnership Project IRS Intrusion Response System
4G Fourth-generation mobile network LTE Long-Term Evolution
5G Fifth-generation mobile network LTE-A Long-Term Evolution Advenced
AES Advanced Encryption Standard M2M Machine-to-Machine
AIM Advanced Identity Management MAC Message Authentication Code
AKA Authentication and Key Agreement MD5 Message Digest 5
AMAC Aggregate Message Authentication Codes MIMO Multiple-Input Multiple-Output
AP Access point MITM Man-in-the-middle
BRPCA Bayesian Robust Principal Component Analysis MME Mobility Management Entity
BS Base station MSS Managed security services
BTS Base Transceiver Station MTC Machine Type Communication
CNN Controller Area Network NB Narrowband
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check NFV Network Function Virtualization
CXTP Context transfer protocol P2P Peer-to-Peer
D2D Device-to-Device communication PIN Personal identification number
DNN Deep Neural Network PKI Public key infrastructure
DoS Denial of Service PT Pseudo Trust
DSS Digital signature standard RAN Radio Access Network
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol RF Radio Frequency
ECC Error Correction Codes RFC Requests For Comments
eNB eNodeB RFID Radio frequency identification
FBS False Base Station RNN Random Neural Network
FIFO First In First Out RNTI Radio Network Temporary Identities
GBS-AKA Group-Based Secure Authentication and Key Agreement SDN Software Defined Networking
HeNB Home eNodeB SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code SIP Session Initiation Protocol
HSS Home Service Server TLS Transport Layer Security
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol TPM Trusted Platform Module
IDS Intrusion Detection system UAV Unmanned aerial vehicle
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers UE User Equipment
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity UHF UltraHigh Frequency
IoT Internet of Things UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
of Quality of Service (QoS). Fast vertical handover and the
general openness of the network make the devises susceptible
to several vulnerabilities like access control, communication
security, data confidentiality, availability and privacy. Further-
more, since the 5G environment is IP-based, it will suffer from
all the vulnerabilities that are to IP-specific. Based on these
findings, it is obvious that guaranteeing a high level of security
and privacy will be one of important aspects for the successful
deployment of 5G networks [8].
As mobile devices will be connected to the network all
the time, through the vertical handover, they will obtain a
notion of social nodes. Such nodes can more easily be tracked
down and are more vulnerable in several types of attacks,
like impersonation, eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle, denial-
of-service, replay and repudiation attack [9]. Maintaining a
high level of QoS in terms of delay, when huge volume of
data is transferred inside a 5G network, while keeping on the
same time high security and privacy level, is critical in order
to prevent malicious files from penetrating the system and
propagating fast among mobile devices. Thus communications
that satisfy zero latency requirements are cumbersome once
combined with secure and privacy-preserving 5G networks
[10].
For the process of conducting the literature review, we fol-
low the same process conducted by our previous work in [9].
Specifically, the identification of literature for analysis in this
paper was based on a keyword search, namely, "authentication
and privacy-preserving scheme", "authentication and privacy-
preserving protocol", "authentication and privacy-preserving
system", and "authentication and privacy-preserving frame-
work". Searching for these keywords in academic databases
such as SCOPUS, Web of Science, IEEE Xplore Digital
Library, and ACM Digital Library, an initial set of relevant
sources were located. Firstly, only proposed authentication and
privacy-preserving schemes for 4G and 5G cellular networks
were collected. Secondly, each collected source was evaluated
against the following criteria: 1) reputation, 2) relevance, 3)
originality, 4) date of publication (between 2005 and 2017),
and 5) most influential papers in the field. The final pool of
papers consists of the most important papers in the field of
4G and 5G cellular networks that focus on the authentication
and privacy-preserving as their objective. Our search started
3on 15/01/2017 and continued until the submission date of this
paper.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• We discuss the existing surveys for 4G and 5G cellular
networks that deal with communications, applications,
standardization, and security.
• We provide a classification for the attacks in cellular
networks in four categories, including, attacks against pri-
vacy, attacks against integrity, attacks against availability,
and attacks against authentication.
• We provide a classification for countermeasures used by
the authentication and privacy preserving schemes for 4G
and 5G cellular networks into three types of categories,
including, cryptography methods, humans factors, and
intrusion detection methods.
• We present the informal and formal security analysis tech-
niques used by the authentication and privacy preserving
schemes for 4G and 5G cellular networks.
• We provide a categorization of authentication and privacy
models for 4G and 5G cellular networks.
• We provide a classification of authentication and privacy
preserving schemes for 4G and 5G cellular networks
in seven types, including, handover authentication with
privacy, mutual authentication with privacy, RFID authen-
tication with privacy, deniable authentication with privacy,
authentication with mutual anonymity, authentication and
key agreement with privacy, and three-factor authentica-
tion with privacy.
• We outline six recommendations for further research,
including, 1) privacy preservation for Fog paradigm-
based 5G radio access network, 2) authentication for 5G
small cell-based smart grids, 3) privacy preservation for
SDN/NFV-based architecture in 5G scenarios, 4) dataset
for intrusion detection in 5G scenarios, 5) privacy pre-
serving schemes for UAV systems in 5G heterogeneous
communication environment, and 6) authentication for 5G
small cell-based vehicular crowdsensing.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the existing surveys for 4G and 5G cellular net-
works that deal with communications, applications, standard-
ization, and security. In Section III, we provide a classification
for the threat models and countermeasures. Section IV presents
various the informal and formal security analysis techniques
used by the authentication and privacy preserving schemes
for 4G and 5G cellular networks. In Section V, we present a
side-by-side comparison in a tabular form for the current state-
of-the-art of authentication and privacy preserving schemes
for 4G and 5G cellular networks. Then, we discuss open
issues and recommendations for further research in Section
VI. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section VII. Table II
lists the acronyms and notations used in the paper.
II. EXISTING SURVEYS FOR 4G AND 5G CELLULAR
NETWORKS
There are around fifty survey articles published in the recent
years that deal with 4G and 5G communications, applications,
standardization and security. These survey articles are catego-
rized as shown in tables III and IV. From these survey articles
only seven of them deal with security and privacy issues for
3G, 4G and 5G cellular networks and none of the previous
works covers the authentication and privacy preserving issues
of 4G and 5G networks. This work is the first on the literature
that thoroughly covers authentication and privacy preservation
threat models, countermeasures and schemes that we recently
proposed from the research community.
For these fifty survey articles that were retrieved from SCO-
PUS and Web of Science and were published from 2007 to
2017 we performed a categorization which is presented in table
III. Based on this categorization it is obvious that except from
three big categories of articles, one dealing with scheduling
and interference mitigation [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [8],
the other with D2D Communication [16], [17], [18], [19],
[20], [21] and the third with security and privacy issues [22],
[23], [24], [25], [8], [26], [27], all areas of research that are
somehow related to 3G, 4G and 5G networks were surveyed
and presented in previous surveys from at least one review
article. As the technology progress and the networks evolve
from 3G to 4G, 5G and even 6G [28], the number of articles
that survey 4G and 5G networks increases from only one that
was published back in 2007, to over twenty articles published
in 2016. This increase on the number reveals an increase on
the importance that researchers from around the world give
on the new technology and the issues that arise regarding
standardization [29], [30], [31], mobile internet applications
[32], resource and mobility management [33], [34], energy
[35], MIMO techniques [34], [20], [36], social perspectives
[37] and so on (See Table III for detailed categorization).
Among the aforementioned surveys, the security and privacy
issues that are related to the 4G and 5G networks were
thoroughly covered and analyzed in previous works [22],
[23], [24], [25], [8], [26], [27]. As it is shown in Tab.
V authentication and privacy preservation was only covered
partially from Cao et al. [24] while the rest of the articles did
not cover this major security aspect. In this article we survey
authentication and privacy preserving protocols for 4G/5G
networks. Based on this thorough analysis open issues and
future directions are identified, that combine both innovative
research and novel implementations, along with application
of properly adapted existing solutions from other fields. We
believe that this study will help researchers focus on the
important aspects of authentication and privacy preservation
issues in the 4G and 5G area and will guide them towards
their future research.
III. THREAT MODELS AND COUNTERMEASURES
A. Threat models
In this subsection, we discuss the threat models in 4G and
5G Cellular Networks. We found thirty-five attacks, which
are analyzed and prevented by authentication and privacy
preserving schemes for 4G and 5G Cellular Networks. The
classification of threat models in cellular networks frequently
mentioned in literature is done using different criteria such as
passive or active, internal or external etc. In our survey article,
we classify the attacks in cellular networks in four categories
as shown in Fig. 2, including, 1) attacks against privacy, 2)
4TABLE III
AREAS OF RESEARCH OF EACH SURVEY ARTICLE FOR 4G AND 5G CELLULAR NETWORKS
SIM: Scheduling and Interference Mitigation; SP: Security and Privacy; HD: Heterogeneous Deployments; VN: Vehicular Networking; GCN: Green Cellular
Networks; STD: Standardization; MIA: Mobile Internet Applications; RC: Random access channel; D2D: Device-to-Device Communication; RMM:
Resource & Mobility Management; DO: Data Offloading; HM: Handover Management; SDN: Software-defined networking; US: Unlicensed Spectrum;
ENE: Energy; BN: Backhaul network; DNMA: Downlink Non-orthogonal Multiple Access; MIMO: Multiple-Input Multiple-Output technologies; Soc:
Social perspective; CC: Cloud Computing; mmWave: millimeter wave communications; Archi: Architecture.
Ref. SIM SP HD VN GCN STD MIA RC RMM D2D DO HM SDN US ENE BN DNMA MIMO Soc CC mmWave Archi
[11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [8]
√
[22] [23] [24] [25] [8] [26] [27]
√
[38] [39] [40] [41]
√
[42] [43]
√
[44] [45] [46]
√
[29] [30] [31]
√
[32]
√
[47] [8]
√
[33] [34]
√
[16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21]
√
[48]
√
[49]
√
[50] [51]
√
[52]
√
[35]
√
[53] [54]
√
[55] [56]
√
[57] [20] [36]
√
[37]
√
[58] [59]
√
[60]
√
[20]
√
Disclosure attackTracing attack
Privacy violation
Masquerade attack
Chosen5plaintext
attack
Stalking attack
Adaptive chosen
ciphertext attack
Spoofing attack
Message blocking
Tampering attack
Parallel session
attack
FIFO attackCloning attack
Replay attack
Eavesdropping attack
Message insertion
attack
Message modification
attack
Physical attack
Password stealing attack
Off5line password
guessing attack
Dictionary attack
Redirection attack
Denial of service
BDoSL attack
Brute force attack
Password reuse attack
Leak of verifier
attack
Forgery attack
Attacks against authentication
Desynchronization attack
Stolen smart
card attack
Partial5message
collision attack
Collaborated attack
Impersonation attack
Attacks in 4G and 5G
Cellular Networks
Attacks against availability
Attacks against integrityMan5in5the5middle
attack
Free5riding
attack
Attacks against privacy Skimming attack
Spam attack
Fig. 2. Classification of attacks in 4G and 5G Cellular Networks
attacks against integrity, 3) attacks against availability, and 4)
attacks against authentication. Note that our classification is
based on the behavior of the attack in 4G and 5G cellular
networks.
1) Attacks against privacy: We classify fourteen attacks in
this category, namely, eavesdropping attack, parallel session
attack, replay attack, Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack, im-
personation attack, collaborated attack, tracing attack, spoofing
attack, privacy violation, adaptive chosen ciphertext attack,
chosen-plaintext attack, stalking attack, masquerade attack,
and disclosure attack. The most serious attack among them
is the MITM attack. According to Conti et al. [61], the
MITM attack in cellular networks is based on False Base
Station (FBS) attack, when malicious third party masquerades
its Base Transceiver Station (BTS) as a real network’s BTS.
Using a temporary confidential channel, Chen et al. [62]
proposed an idea that only requires minimum number of
human interaction for detecting and avoiding the MITM attack
in cellular networks. Mayrhofer et al. [63] proposed a unified
cryptographic authentication protocol framework to use with
arbitrary auxiliary channels in order to detect the MITM attack
5TABLE IV
YEAR OF PUBLICATION
Ref. Year
[26] 2007
[11] [22] [27] 2010
[38] 2011
[44] 2012
[12] [42] [29] [32] [23] 2013
[47] [24] [33] [16] [13] [21] [31] 2014
[45] [17] [48] [49] [14] [34] [60] [20] [59] [36] 2015
[50] [25] [15] [52] [51] [39] [18] [43] [35] [53] [40] [8] [55] [57] [19] [34] [30] [54] [46] [58] 2016
[14] [37] [41] [56] 2017
TABLE V
COMPARISON OF RELATED SURVEYS IN THE LITERATURE (SURVEY ON
SECURITY AND PRIVACY FOR 4G AND 5G CELLULAR NETWORKS)√
:indicates fully supported; X: indicates not supported; 0: indicates
partially supported.
Ref. 3G 4G 5G Authen. Privacy-
preserving
Comments
Park, Y. and Park, T.
(2007) [26]
√
X X X X - Presented some security threats on 4G net-
works.
Aiash et al. (2010)
[27]
√
X X 0 X - Reviewed the X.805 standard for the AKA
protocol.
Seddigh et al. (2010)
[22]
√
X X X X - Surveyed the security advances for MAC
layer in 4G technologies LTE and WiMAX.
Bikos and Sklavos
(2013) [23]
0
√
X X X - Presented the cryptographic algorithms for
LTE.
Cao et al. (2014) [24] X
√
X 0 X - Presented the security architectures and
mechanisms specified by the 3GPP standard.
Lichtman et al.
(2016) [25]
X
√
X X X - Surveyed the jamming and spoofing mitiga-
tion techniques for LTE.
Panwar et al. (2016)
[8]
X X
√
X X - Presented the challenges in security and
privacy in 5G networks.
Our Work 0
√ √ √ √
- Surveyed the authentication and privacy-
preserving schemes for 4G and 5G Cellular
Networks.
in cellular networks. Based on the combination of learning par-
ity with noise, circulant matrix, and multivariate quadratic, Li
et al. [64] introduced an entity authentication protocol, which
is proved that it is secure against all probabilistic polynomial-
time adversaries under MITM attack model. However, note
that the MITM attack is a particular case of a replay attack.
By support mutual authentication, Chen et al. [65] proposed
the improved smart-card-based password authentication and
key agreement scheme that can easily detect a replay attack
by checking the timestamp. The question we ask here is:
Does detecting the replay attack is sufficient to detect the
MITM attack? The privacy-preserving authentication scheme
proposed recently by Haddad et al. [66] can answer this
question where he can prove that the idea of checking the
timestamp to detecting the MITM attack is not sufficient,
but it is necessary to use the private keys that are not
known to the attackers. Yao et al. [67] proposed a group-
based secure authentication scheme, named, GBS-AKA, which
he can detect the MITM attack using the session keys and
timestamp during the authentication procedure. Through the
MITM attack, the attacker can launch the other attacks of this
category such as eavesdropping attacks to intercept keys and
messages by unintended receivers.
2) Attacks against integrity: We classify six attacks in
this category, namely, spam attack, message blocking, cloning
attack, message modification attack, message insertion attack,
and tampering attack. Note that the Spam attack can be
classified in the category of attacks against availability. An
attack against integrity is based on the modification of a data
exchanged between the 5G access points and the mobile users.
However, the authentication and privacy preserving schemes
for 4G and 5G cellular networks use mostly the hash functions
for assuring integrity of transmitted data. The SHA-1 and
MD5 algorithms are frequently used as hash functions, which
can easily detect the attacks against integrity by verifying an
incorrect hash value.
3) Attacks against availability: We classify six attacks
in this category, namely, First In First Out (FIFO) attack,
redirection attack, physical attack, skimming attack, and free-
riding attack. The goal of an attack against availability is to
make a service as unavailable, e.g., the data routing service.
By gathering entering time and exiting time intervals, the
FIFO attack can be launched by a strong adversary. Gao et
al. [68] discuss the FIFO attack and propose a trajectory mix-
zones graph model. The redirection attack is easily possible
when an adversary gets the correct user entity information by
increase its signal strength to redirect or by impersonating a
base station in the 4G and 5G cellular networks. To protect the
network from redirection attack, Saxena et al. [69] and Li et al.
[70] proposed the same idea that uses a MAC to maintain the
integrity of tracking area identity, while Yao et al. [67] uses
the local area identifier embedded with MAC. Therefore, the
free-riding attack can cause a serious threat and reduces the
system availability of D2D communication in the 4G and 5G
cellular networks. By keeping a record of the current status of
the user equipment and realize reception non-repudiation by
key hint transmission, the proposed protocol by Zhang et al.
[71] can detect the free-riding attack.
4) Attacks against authentication: We classify ten attacks
in this category, namely, password reuse attack, password
stealing attack, dictionary attack, brute force attack, desyn-
chronization attack, forgery attack, leak of verifier attack,
partial-message collision attack, and stolen smart card attack.
The goal of an attack against authentication is to disrupt the
client-to-server authentication and the server-to-client authen-
tication. The password reuse attack and password stealing
attack disrupt the password-based authentication schemes,
which the attacker pretends to be legitimate user and attempts
to login on to the server by guessing different words as
password from a dictionary. The stolen smart card attack and
off-line guessing attack disrupt the smart-card-based remote
user password authentication schemes, which if a user’s smart
card is stolen, the attacker can extract the stored information
without knowing any passwords.
B. Countermeasures
In this subsection, we discuss the countermeasures used by
the authentication and privacy preserving schemes for 4G and
5G cellular networks. Tab. VIpresents all the countermeasures
used by the authentication and privacy preserving schemes
for 4G and 5G cellular networks. These countermeasures
can be classified into three types of categories, including,
cryptography methods, humans factors, and intrusion detection
methods, as presented in Fig. 3.
1) Cryptography methods: Cryptographic methods are the
most used by the authentication and privacy preserving
6TABLE VI
COUNTERMEASURES USED BY THE AUTHENTICATION AND PRIVACY
PRESERVING SCHEMES FOR 4G AND 5G CELLULAR NETWORKS
Countermeasures Authentication and privacy preserving schemes that
use the countermeasure
Secure hash function [72] , [73], [74], [75], [76], [77], [78], [79], [80], [81],
[82], [83], [84], [85], [86], [87], [88], [89], [90], [91],
[92], [93], [62], [94], [63], [64], [95], [96], [65], [97],
[98], [99], [100], [66], [101], [102], [103], [104], [105],
[106], [107], [108], [109], [110], [71]
Index-pseudonym [83]
UMTS-AKA mechanism [111], [112]
Message Authentication Code (MAC) [112], [75], [88], [62]
Electronic Product Code (EPC) [113], [77]
Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) and
Intrusion Detection Exchange Protocol (IDXP)
[114]
Digital certificate and signature [74], [71]
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [74], [115], [116] , [97], [98]
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [73]
APFS protocol and Digital signature standard (DSS) [75]
Password [76], [79], [85], [86], [91], [92]
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [76], [116]
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [76]
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [77], [84], [63], [69], [71]
Pseudorandom Number Generator (PRNG) [117], [83], [105]
Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC-16) [117], [105]
Homomorphic Encryption [109], [118]
Paillier cryptosystem [109], [118]
Forward security technique [78]
Error Correction Codes (ECC) [98], [119]
Anonymous ticket [120]
Biometrics [79]
Blind signature and Rabin’s public key cryptosystem [80]
Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman protocol (ECDH) [103], [106], [81], [89]
Bootstrapping Pseudonym (BP), Home Fast Pseudonym
(HFP), and Visited Fast Pseudonym (VFP)
[121]
Advanced Identity Management (AIM) [82]
Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) [122]
Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) [122]
Personal Identification Number (PIN) [111]
Semantic secure symmetric encryption [78]
Smart cards [99], [100], [102], [106], [79]
Proxy-signature scheme [87]
Network domain security (NDS)/IP [89]
Trusted Node Authentication (TNA) [90]
Schnorr’s signature scheme [93]
Pseudo-Location Swapping (PLS) [123]
Symmetric encryption [62], [96], [69]
Hierarchical identity-based signature [94]
Mobile vector network protocol [94]
Hamming weight of vector [64]
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) [95], [110], [69]
Radio Network Temporary Identities (RNTI) [95]
Fuzzy extractor [100], [106]
Certificate revocation [66]
Group signatures with verifier local revocation [101]
Group-based access authentication [124]
Aggregate Message Authentication Codes AMAC [104], [108]
Designated verifier proxy signature (DVPS) [110]
schemes for 4G and 5G cellular networks, which can be
classified into three types of categories, including, public-
key cryptography, symmetric-key cryptography, and unkeyed
cryptography.
The schemes [74], [115], [116], [97], and [98] use the public
key infrastructure (PKI) [125] in order to identify the genuine
access point (AP) or base station (BS). Both schemes [109],
[118] use the Paillier cryptosystem [126], which is based
on three algorithms, namely, generation of keys, encryption,
and decryption. The generation of keys is based on two
large, independent and random prime numbers: p and q. Let
Countermeasures
Cryptography
methods
Public-key
Symmetric-
key
Unkeyed
Humans factors
Password
Biometrics
Smart cards
Intrusion detection
methods
Signature
Based
Anomaly
Based
Hybrid IDS
Fig. 3. Classification of countermeasures used by the authentication and
privacy preserving schemes for 4G and 5G cellular networks
m be a message to be encrypted, the encryption algorithm
computes c = (1 + N)m · rNmod N2 where 0 ≤ m < N ,
r is a random integer 0 < r < N , and the public key
N = p · q. To find the clear text m, the decryption algorithm
computes m = (c.r−Nmod N2)−1N . The scheme [80] uses both
Blind signature [127] and Rabin’s public key cryptosystem
[128]. The blind signature involves two entities, namely: 1)
a signer and 2) a signature requester, in which the content
of a message is disguised from its signature. Rabin’s public
key cryptosystem is characterized by its asymmetric computa-
tional cost and requires a large amount of computation effort.
The Group signatures with verifier local revocation [129] is
used by the scheme [101] in order to provide conditional
anonymity. Furthermore, Boneh et al. [130] proposed short
group signatures due to group signatures based on Strong-
RSA are too long for some applications. The digital signature
standard (DSS) [131] is used by the PT scheme [75] in
order to provide confidentiality and integrity to data exchanges
after authentication as well as to simplify the key exchange
protocol.
The symmetric encryption is used by four schemes, namely,
[62], [96], [69], [78], in order to provide user anonymity.
Specifically, Chen et al. [62] use the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) as the symmetric data encryption algorithm
for mobile devices. Based on the idea that symmetric key
algorithms faster than asymmetric key algorithms, Saxena et
al. [69] proposed an authentication protocol that is entirely
based on the symmetric key cryptosystem for an IoT-enabled
LTE network. Therefore, the question we ask here is: can the
strategy of only using symmetric key techniques to achieve
user anonymity is reliable? The improved privacy-preserving
authentication scheme proposed recently by Wang et al. in
[96] can answer this question where he can proved that the
strategy of only using symmetric-key techniques to achieve
user anonymity is intrinsically infeasible. In addition, Lu et
al. [78] use semantic secure symmetric encryption in order to
preserve the location privacy.
Hash functions are used almost in all the authentication and
privacy preserving schemes in order to provide data integrity
for the encrypted messages. We note that these schemes use
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Fig. 4. Classification of security analysis techniques
three popular methods, namely, the Message Authentication
Code (MAC) [132], the Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code (HMAC) [133], and the Aggregate Message Authenti-
cation Codes (AMAC) [134].
2) Humans factors: The humans’ factors-based counter-
measures are proposed to ensure authentication. The research
community has proposed three factors, namely, 1) what you
know (e.g., passwords, personal identification number (PIN)),
2) what you have (e.g., token, smart cards, passcodes, RFID),
and 3) who are you (e.g., biometrics like fingerprints and iris
scan, signature or voice). The methods based on what you
know (e.g., passwords) might be divulged or forgotten, and
the methods based on what you have (e.g., smart cards) might
be shared, lost, or stolen. In contrast, the methods based on
who are you (e.g., fingerprints or iris scans) have no such
drawbacks. Note that these three factors can be used together
or alone.
3) Intrusion detection methods: Intrusion Detection sys-
tems (IDS) are the second stage of defense. In situations
when an intruder has already managed to bypass all existing
countermeasures and has already taken control of a legal entity
of the network, an IDS must spot misbehavior fast enough in
order to be efficient. There are a lot of new methods that
have been proposed during the previous years for detecting
intruders in 4G and 5G networks. In [135] authors propose
a novel IDS based on Bayesian Robust Principal Component
Analysis (BRPCA). Based on the observation that network
traffic variables are non-stationary and exhibit 24 h periodicity,
the proposed anomaly detection approach represents network
traffic as a sequence of traffic variable vectors. The method
was evaluated against two synthetic datasets that represent
a DOS and femtocell-based attack respectively. Trying to
combat a similar attack, a virtual jamming attack, authors
in [136] proposed a novel hybrid NIDS based on Dempster-
Shafer (DS) Theory of Evidence. The performance of the
method, that combines a signature-based and an anomaly
based IDS, was evaluated on an experimental IEEE 802.11
network testbed.
In [137] authors propose an adaptive intrusion detection sys-
tem that uses a hidden Markov Model for detecting intrusions
on small cell access point in a 5G wireless communication
networks. Authors focused on the bandwidth spoofing attack.
During this attack, the attacker tries to acquire the bandwidth
that is going to be assigned from the BS to the SCA, thus
blocking its communication. The method is proved to be capa-
ble of detecting and removing the intruder which is executing a
bandwidth spoofing attack on the SCA (small cell access) in a
5G WCN. In [138] authors proposed an RNN-based (Random
Neural Network) approach for detecting of large scale Internet
anomalies based on the analysis of captured network data.
Authors we mostly interested in investigating application spe-
cific anomalies and conducted the evaluation of their proposed
method on semi-synthetic data, derived from real traffic traces.
Relying on fuzzy logic principles, authors propose in [139] a
novel Intrusion Detection System. The proposed IDS uses an
Adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy Inference System and is created for 5G
Wireless Communication Network (WCN). The proposed IDS
is a fuzzy inference system integrated with neural networks
taking advantage of the benefits of both systems [140]. Authors
evaluated their method against DOS attacks, like the previous
methods in [135], [136], [137], [138] using the KDD cup 99
dataset. In a scenario where malicious data packets coming
from a 3G, 4G or Wi-Fi network that the vehicle use in order
to communicate with surrounding vehicles, manage to enter
into the in-vehicle CAN bus is investigated in [141]. Authors
in [141] propose IDS that uses a deep neural network (DNN)
in order to detect an attack after it has entered the CAN
(controller area network). The proposed IDS provides a real-
time response to the attack with good accuracy.
Dealing with attacks in LTE networks, authors in [142]
propose a random packet inspection scheme. The proposed
scheme has an inspection rate that can be dynamically adjusted
based on the perceived intrusion period of the session. This
way the IDS performs a deep packet inspection, which is nec-
essary in order to reveal the presence of signatures or malicious
codes, while on the same time being an efficient and quick
way of inspection. This method provides an effective tool for
balancing induced inspection cost with detection latency in
8LTE core networks. In [143] authors cope with intrusions
in wireless sensor networks. The authors having identified
the key aspects of such a network, e.g. Highly dynamic
network conditions, limited bandwidth and transmission of
sensitive data, propose TermID and test its efficiency using
the Aegean wireless intrusion dataset version 2 [144]. The
proposed method achieves both low network footprint and user
privacy. Taking in mind privacy along with security, authors
in [114] propose a location aware mobile IDS system. The
proposed mIPS is a location-aware intrusion detection and
prevention system with enhanced privacy handling.
Intelligence of intruders affects the effectiveness of IDS.
This situation is investigated in [145] where authors imple-
mented two AI-enabled intrusion algorithms and evaluated
the impact of intruder’s intelligence on the intrusion detection
capability of a WSN under various circumstances. Moving
one step further, authors in [146] review the area of Intrusion
Response Systems (IRS). An IRS taking in mind the current
situation on the network may choose the optimal response
option. Based on the research of the authors, IRS cannot
handle false alarms that are produced from the IDS and in
the future a false alarm handler is an important component
that must be integrated in every IDS/IRS.
IV. INFORMAL AND FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
TECHNIQUES
Researchers in the Security and Privacy fields use the formal
and informal techniques to analyze, prove, and verify the
reliability of their proposed security scheme, and especially for
schemes that are based on cryptography as a tool for achieving
the authentication and privacy. Therefore, we classify these
techniques on two classes, including, 1) Without an implemen-
tation tool and 2) With an implementation tool, as presented
in Fig. 4. In addition, Tab. VII. summarizes the informal and
formal security analysis techniques used in authentication and
privacy preserving schemes for 4G and 5G Cellular Networks.
For the first class, we classify in ’without an implementa-
tion tool’ eight techniques, including, Zero-Knowledge Proof
[148], Mathematical difficulties, GNY logic [150], CK security
model [151], Random oracle model [156], Game theory [157],
Probabilistic functions [159], and BAN logic [162]. To analyze
the completeness of a cryptographic protocol, both schemes
[161] and [79] use the GNY logic [150]. The scheme [93] use
random oracle model [156] to show that there is an adversary
A can construct an algorithm to solve the CDH problem or
the k-CAA problem separately. The scheme [106] uses the
BAN logic [162] to demonstrate that the scheme is valid and
practical. The mathematical difficulties is used by the scheme
[109] to achieve security and privacy using discrete logarithm
and computational Diffie-Hellman problems. Furthermore, the
game theory [157] is used by the scheme [62] to prove
the security of the bipartite protocol by designing a game
that turns a CDH instance into the protocol. According to
Manshaei et al. [157], the game approach is related to the
security problem to be solved, e.g., the stackelberg game
for Jamming/Eavesdropping, the static security cost game for
Interdependent Security, and the static non-zerosum game for
Vendor Patch Management.
For the second class, we classify in ’with an implementation
tool’ four techniques, including, AVISPA tool [153], Open-
source MIT Kerberos implementation v.1.6.3 [154], OpenUAT
[158], and ProVerif [155]. The Open-source MIT Kerberos
[154] is used especially for evaluate the performance of the
enhanced Kerberos protocol such as the scheme [120]. The
OpenUAT [158] is used by the scheme [63] to implement
some intuitive authentication methods in a common library. To
verify the secrecy of the real identity and the resistance against
known attacks, four schemes [108], [102], [101], and [101]
use the ProVerif [155], which is an automatic cryptographic
protocol verifier, in the formal model, called Dolev-Yao model.
Specifically, the ProVerif takes as input a model of the protocol
in an extension of the pi calculus with cryptography. For more
details about the ProVerif, we refer the reader to the work of
Blanchet in [165]. Therefore, five schemes [163], [164], [87],
[88], and [82] use the AVISPA tool [153] based on the HLPSL
language [153] to verify the security of these schemes against
insider attacks and outsider attacks.
V. AUTHENTICATION AND PRIVACY PRESERVING SCHEMES
FOR 4G AND 5G CELLULAR NETWORKS
In this section, we will discuss the comparison of authenti-
cation and privacy preserving schemes for 4G and 5G Cellular
Networks in term of authentication and privacy models. After
reviewing around 50 papers published between 2005 and 2017,
which are indexed in Scopus and Web of Science, we cate-
gorized the authentication and privacy models, as presented
in Fig. 5, TabVIII, and Tab IX. Based on this categorization,
we classify the schemes in seven types (as presented in Fig.
6), including, 1) Handover authentication with privacy, 2)
Mutual authentication with privacy, 3) RFID authentication
with privacy, 4) Deniable authentication with privacy, 5)
Authentication with mutual anonymity, 6) Authentication and
key agreement with privacy, and 7) Three-factor authentication
with privacy. Tab. XI summarizes the authentication and
privacy preserving schemes for 4G and 5G Cellular Networks.
A. Handover authentication with privacy
Based on the cryptographic primitives, the existing handover
authentication schemes for LTE wireless networks can be
classified into three categories, including, 1) Symmetrical key-
based scheme, 2) Public key-based scheme, and 3) Hybrid
scheme. In LTE wireless networks, there are two types of base
stations, namely, Home eNodeB (HeNB) and eNodeB (eNB).
According to Cao et al. [87], the 3GPP project suggested
handover from an eNB/HeNB to a new eNB/HeNB cannot
achieve backward security in handover procedures. Specifi-
cally, the authors proposed a handover authentication scheme
for the mobility scenarios in the LTE networks. Based on
the idea of proxy signature, the scheme [87] provide several
security features, including, perfect forward and backward
secrecy. In addition, the scheme [87] is efficient in terms of
computational cost and communication overhead compared
with the handover scheme in [176], but the identity privacy
is not considered. Similar to the scheme [87], Cao et al. [89]
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INFORMAL AND FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES USED IN AUTHENTICATION AND PRIVACY PRESERVING SCHEMES FOR 4G AND 5G
CELLULAR NETWORKS
Ref. Year Tool Authentication model to
prove
Privacy model to prove Main results Implem.
[112] 2007 - Communicating
Sequential Processes
(CSP) [147];
- Rank Functions;
- Mutual authentication
- Biometric authentication
- Data privacy - Formalize the authentication and key establish-
ment properties of the IDM3G protocol as trace
specifications.
No
[75] 2008 - Zero-Knowledge Proof
[148]
- User authentication - Mutual anonymity - Analyze the anonymity degree of the PT protocol. No
[115] 2009 - Strand spaces model
[149]
- Authentication and Key
Agreement
- Confidentiality - Analyze security performance of the authentica-
tion and key agreement protocol.
No
[79] 2009 - GNY logic [150] - Three-factor authentication
- Remote user authentication
- Privacy of the biometric data - Analyze the completeness of a cryptographic
protocol.
No
[81] 2009 - CK security model
[151]
- Mutual authentication and
key agreement
- N/A - Prove that the NAKE protocol is probably secure. No
[121] 2010 - Network Address Iden-
tifier (NAI) format [152]
- Fast re-authentication - Identity privacy - Test the privacy solution behavior. No
[82] 2010 - AVISPA tool [153];
- HLPSL language [153];
- Mutual authentication - Identity privacy - Prove the efficiency of the identity management
mechanism.
Yes
[120] 2011 - Open-source MIT
Kerberos implementation
v.1.6.3 [154]
- Cross-realm authentication - Anonymity;
- Service access untraceability;
- Evaluate the performance of the enhanced Ker-
beros protocol.
Yes
[87] 2012 - AVISPA tool [153];
- HLPSL language [153];
- Handover authentication - N/A - Show that the scheme can work correctly to
achieve robust security properties.
Yes
[88] 2012 - AVISPA tool [153];
- HLPSL language [153];
- Handover authentication - Identity privacy - Ensure the security of the handover authentication
scheme.
Yes
[92] 2012 - ProVerif [155] - Identity based authentication - N/A - Guarantee the necessary security features claimed
by the oPass protocol.
Yes
[93] 2012 - Random oracle model
[156]
- Authentication and key
agreement
- N/A - Show that there is an adversary A can construct
an algorithm to solve the CDH problem or the k-
CAA problem separately.
No
[62] 2013 - Game theory [157] - Authentication and key
agreement
- N/A - Prove the security of the bipartite protocol by
designing a game that turns a CDH instance into
the protocol.
No
[63] 2013 - OpenUAT [158] - Multichannel authentication - N/A - Implement some intuitive authentication methods
in a common library based.
Yes
[64] 2013 - Probabilistic functions
[159]
- RFID authentication - N/A - Define formally security models for the LCMQ
authentication system.
No
[101] 2015 - ProVerif [155] - Mutual authentication - Location privacy - Verify the system in pi−Calculus with ProVerif. Yes
[102] 2015 - ProVerif [155]
- Game theory [157]
- Remote user authentication - Anonymity - Verify the resistance against known attacks. Yes
[103] 2015 - Bellare–Rogaway [160] - Roaming authentication - Anonymity - Prove the security of scheme under Elliptic Curve
Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) assumption.
No
[161] 2015 - GNY logic [150] - RFID mutual authentication - N/A - Prove the correctness of the LRMAPC protocol. No
[106] 2015 - BAN logic [162] - Biometrics-based authentica-
tion
- Anonymity - Demonstrate that the scheme is valid and practi-
cal.
No
[108] 2016 - ProVerif [155] - Group authentication; - Anonymity;
- Unlinkability;
- Traceability;
- Verify the secrecy of the real identity. Yes
[109] 2016 - Mathematical difficul-
ties
- Anonymous authentication - Location privacy - Achieve security and privacy using discrete loga-
rithm and computational Diffie-Hellman problems.
No
[163] 2016 - AVISPA tool [153] - Mutual authentication with
key agreement
- Location privacy - Verify the protocol security against insider attacks
and outsider attacks.
Yes
[164] 2016 - AVISPA tool [153] - Handover authentication - Anonymity;
- Unlinkability;
- Traceability;
- Non-frameability;
- Show that Nframe can maintain the security
requirements in frequent handover authentication
semantics.
Yes
proposed a handover authentication scheme to fit in with all of
the mobility scenarios in the LTE networks. The scheme can
provide strong security guarantees including perfect forward
secrecy, master key forward secrecy, and user anonymity.
The scheme [89] is efficient in terms of computational cost,
communication cost, and storage cost. As a matter of fact,
these both two schemes [87] [89] do not consider the identity
and location privacy. To solve this problem, the idea of Gao
et al. [68] can be applied with both schemes [87] and [89].
IEEE 802.16m is proposed as an advanced air interface to
meet the requirements of the fourth generation (4G) systems.
To preserves the identity privacy for IEEE 802.16m network,
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TABLE VIII
AUTHENTICATION MODELS ACHIEVED BY SECURITY SCHEMES FOR 4G AND 5G CELLULAR NETWORKS
Authentication models
Schemes Mutual
authen.
Identity-based
authen.
Remote user
authen.
Key
agreement
RFID
authen.
Fast re-
authen.
Three-factor
authen.
Password-based
authen.
Deniable au-
then.
Biometric
authen.
Handover
authen.
[111] [112] [73] [74] [78] [80] [81] [82] [84] [123]
[95] [65] [97] [99] [66] [101] [110] [69] [166] [163]
[112] [79] [106]
[167] [113] [77] [117] [119] [122] [83] [64] [98]
[161]
[72] [76]
[115] [80] [81] [88] [89] [91] [93] [62] [65] [99] [66]
[104] [110] [163]
[79] [100]
[79] [86] [100] [102]
[121]
[85] [96] [107]
[87] [88] [89] [124] [104] [164]
[91] [92] [94]
TABLE IX
PRIVACY MODELS ACHIEVED BY SECURITY SCHEMES FOR 4G AND 5G CELLULAR NETWORKS
Privacy models
Schemes Identity pri-
vacy
Location pri-
vacy
Anonymity RFID
privacy
Untraceability Non-
frameability
Traceability Conditional
privacy
Forward pri-
vacy
Privacy preserving
data aggregation
[108] [164]
[71] [166]
[111] [74] [121] [82] [118] [116] [88] [110] [85]
[164]
[113] [167] [83] [96] [98] [101] [102] [103] [124]
[106] [108] [69] [166] [164] [120]
[77] [117] [119]
[78] [83] [84] [68] [123] [98] [101] [109] [163]
[121] [120] [103] [69]
[69]
[66]
TABLE X
NOTATIONS USED IN COMPARISON OF COMPUTATIONAL COST AND
COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
Notation Definition
TE The time complexity for exponentiation
TSE The time complexity for small-exponent exponentiation
TH The time complexity for hash function
TS The time complexity for symmetric encryption/decryption
TM The computation cost of multiplication operation
TECC The time complexity for ECC-based scalar multiplication
TCOM The time to upload the encrypted traffic using 5G communication links
TL Lagrange component time
e The cost between the MTC device and the eNB
η The cost between mobility management entities
n The number of MTC device
m The number of groups
Fu et al. (2012) [88] proposed a privacy-preserving fast
handover authentication scheme based on the pseudonym.
Based on the 3-way handshake procedure, the scheme [88]
can achieve the following research objectives, including, 1)
Fast handover, 2) Mutual authentication and key agreement,
and 3) Privacy preservation. In addition, the scheme [88] is
efficient in terms of computation and communication overhead
compared with Fu et al. scheme [177]. The scheme [88] is
does not consider k-anonymity, which is a privacy protection
scheme with the context of location privacy. The following
question is: Is it necessary to apply the k-anonymity improve
user privacy in future 5G networks? Niu et al. [123] show us
that we need to generate and select the dummy users who can
contribute to improving users privacy. As an additional benefit,
the users can improve their location privacy significantly by
applying the idea of pseudo-location swapping [123].
To provide the security key derivation and anonymity for
all of the mobility scenarios in LTE-A networks, Cao et al.
[124] proposed a group-based anonymity handover protocol,
named NAHAP. The NAHAP protocol is efficient in terms of
the signaling cost, the communication cost and the computa-
tional cost compared with the LTE-A handover mechanism.
Similar to NAHAP scheme, the same authors proposed an-
other uniform group-based handover authentication protocol,
named UGHA, which is efficient in term of computational
cost compared with the scheme [178]. Using software-defined
networking, Duan and Wang [179] proposed an authentication
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TABLE XI
SUMMARY OF AUTHENTICATION AND PRIVACY PRESERVING SCHEMES FOR 4G AND 5G CELLULAR NETWORKS
See Tab. X for the notations used.
Scheme Network model Auth. model Privacy model Performances (+) and limitations (-) Complexity
Saxena
et al.
[69]
- LTE cellular system with four
entities, including, user equip-
ment (UE), mobility manage-
ment entity (MME), home ser-
vice server (HSS), and radio ac-
cess point
- Mutual authen-
tication
- Untraceability;
- Forward
privacy;
- Anonymity;
+ Secure against replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack, redirection
attack, impersonation attack, and message modification attack;
+ Provide the untraceability, forward privacy, and anonymity;
+ IoT-enabled LTE network;
+ Reduce bandwidth consumption during authentication;
- The scalability is not considered compared to three schemes [117],
[74], and [75].
Bandwidth consumption:
- Between UE and MME
= 697 bits;
- Between MME and
HSS = 886 bits;
Wang et
al. [96]
- Roaming service in mobile net-
works
- Password-based
authentication
- User anonymity + Can achieve user anonymity;
+ Can withstand offline password guessing attack even if the victim’s
smart card is lost;
+ Efficient in term of computation cost on user side compared to
fives schemes Li et al. [168], Isawa-Morii [169], He et al. [170],
Zhou-Xu [171], and Xu et al. [172];
- The proposed scheme needs to be evaluated in term of communi-
cation overhead;
- The handover delays are not measured;
- Computation cost on
user side : 1TSE +
4TH + 1TS
Cao et al.
[124]
- Machine Type Communica-
tion (MTC) in LTE-A networks
with three entities, including, the
MTC device domain, the 3GPP
network domain, and the MTC
application domain
- Group-
based handover
authentication
- Anonymity + Resistance to replay attack, eavesdropping attack, masquerade
attack, and man-in-the-middle attack;
+ Provide the security key derivation and anonymity;
- The scheme is not proven using the formal security analysis
techniques.
- Signaling cost : 3n + 5
;
- Communication cost :
3en + 4 + η
He and
Wang
[106]
- Multiserver environment - Biometrics-
based
authentication
- Anonymity + Provide mutual authentication;
+ Provide perfect forward secrecy;
+ Suitable for the multiserver environment;
+ Resistance to attacks, including, replay attack, stolen verifier attack,
user impersonation attack, server spoofing attack, modification attack,
and man-in-the-middle attack;
- The desynchronization is not considered.
- Computation cost on
user side : 3TM + 7TH
Fu et al.
[108]
- Machine-type communication
(MTC) model in LTE advanced
networks
- Group authenti-
cation;
- Anonymity;
- Unlinkability;
- Traceability;
+ Provide robust privacy preserving including user anonymity, un-
linkability, and traceability;
+ Guarantee mutual authentication and congestion avoidance;
+ Secure against four attacks, including, replay attack, impersonation
attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and DoS attack;
- The desynchronization attack is not considered.
- Computation overhead:
(8n + 6 m) TH + (3n +
m) TM ;
- Signaling overhead: n+
6m
Mahmoud
et al.
[109]
- LTE network-based advanced
metering infrastructure (AMI)
- Anonymous au-
thentication
- Location pri-
vacy
+ Secure against impersonation attack, DoS attack, replay attack, and
man-in-the-Middle attack;
+ Verify the authenticity and integrity of the aggregated bids;
+ Can achieve the privacy requirements with almost negligible
performance degradation;
- The proposed scheme is not compared with other related schemes.
- The aggregated signa-
ture needs only 56 bytes
Ramadan
et al.
[110]
- LTE cellular system with four
entities, including, user equip-
ment, mobility management en-
tity, home service server, and ra-
dio access point
- Mutual authen-
tication and key
agreement
- Identity privacy + Secure against pro
ling attack, false base station attack, and replay attack;
+ Provide the security architecture with flexibility and reliability;
+ Provide forward/backward secrecy;
- The man-in-the-middle attack is not considered compared to the
scheme [64];
- Computation cost on
user side : 4TECC +
2TH + 2TP + TM
Hashem
Eiza et
al. [166]
-Multi-tier 5G enabled vehicular
network with six entites, includ-
ing, HetNets, D2D communica-
tions, a cloud platform, depart-
ment of motor vehicles (DMV),
trust authority (TA), and law en-
forcement agency (LEA)
- Mutual authen-
tication
- Conditional
anonymity ;
- Traceability
of misbehaving
participants
+ Achieve the conditional anonymity and privacy;
+ Resistant to traffic analysis attack, Sybil attack, eavesdropping
attack, and fabrication attack;
+ 5G enabled vehicular networks;
- The desynchronization attack is not considered.
- Computation cost on
user side : 6TH + 2TS ;
- TCOM=13.3s
Hamandi
et al.
[163]
- LTE wireless network - Mutual authen-
tication with key
agreement
- Location pri-
vacy
+ Secure against replay attacks;
+ Minimizes the use of both symmetric and asymmetric key encryp-
tion due to its excessive overhead;
- The untraceability and forward privacy are not considered.
Signaling overhead:
- Case with global ran-
dom identity = 128 bits;
Li et al.
[70]
- Machine-type communication
(MTC) model in LTE advanced
network
- Group-based
authentication
- N/A + Secure against replay attack, redirection attack, man-in-the-middle
attack, DoS attack, and impersonation attack;
+ Can reduce the communication overhead and alleviates the burden
between machine type communication devices;
- The known-key secrecy and the perfect forward secrecy are not
considered compared to the scheme [100].
- Computation cost:
(TL +TH + 2TM )n
Zhang et
al. [103]
- Roaming services in global mo-
bility network
- Roaming au-
thentication
- Anonymity + Preserve the non-repudiation, user anonymity, and untraceability;
+ Provide the perfect forward secrecy;
+ Prevention of impersonation attacks;
- The DoS attack is not considered;
- Computation cost:
4TM + 4TH + 10TS
Fu et al.
[164]
- LTE/LTE-A network with the
public switch telephone network
- Handover au-
thentication
- Anonymity;
- Unlinkability;
- Traceability;
- Non-
frameability;
+ Protection against Man-in-the-Middle attack, DoS attack, and
replay attack;
+ Efficient in terms of computation cost and communication overhead
compared to three schemes, namely, HALP scheme [173], Pair-Hand
scheme [174], and UHAEN scheme [175];
- The perfect forward and backward secrecy are not considered
compared to the scheme [87].
- Computation cost on
user side : 5TM
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Fig. 6. Classification of authentication and privacy preserving schemes for
4G and 5G Cellular Networks
handover scheme with privacy protection in 5G heterogeneous
network communications. Recently, Fu et al. [108] proposed
a novel group authentication protocol with privacy-preserving
to provide unlinkability and traceability in 4G/5 communica-
tions. The scheme [108] is efficient in terms of the signaling
overhead and computation overhead compared to two schemes,
including, Cao’s scheme [180] and SE-AKA [181]. To fit in
with all of the mobility scenarios in the LTA/LTA-A networks,
Fu et al. [164] proposed a privacy-preserving with non-
frameability authentication protocol, called Nframe. To guar-
antee users’ privacy, unlinkability and traceability, the Nframe
protocol uses a pseudonym-based scheme. To achieve a simple
authentication process without a complex key management
and minimize message exchange time, the Nframe protocol
uses pairing-free identity-based cryptography. In addition, the
Mutual
authentication
with privacy
Identity
privacy
Data
integrity
Authenticity
Location
privacy
Fig. 7. Classification of mutual authentication with privacy schemes
Nframe protocol is efficient in terms of computation cost and
communication overhead compared to three schemes, namely,
HALP scheme [173], Pair-Hand scheme [174], and UHAEN
scheme [175], but the perfect forward and backward secrecy
are not considered compared to the scheme [87]. For more
details in the field of handover authentication protocols using
identity-based public key cryptography, we refer the reader to
the recent work of He in [182].
B. Mutual authentication with privacy
To achieve the mutual authentication with privacy, the pro-
posed security schemes for 4G/5G networks need to preserve
the Location privacy, Identity privacy, Data integrity, and
Authenticity, as shown in Fig. 7. However, Dimitriadis and
Polemi (2006) [111] proposed a protocol, named, IDM3G, to
achieving the mutual authentication and identity privacy in 3G.
The IDM3G protocol use two phases, namely, 1) the authen-
tication of the UMTS Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) by
providing a personal identification number and 2) the mutual
authentication between the USIM and the mobile operator. By
using the authentication request based on HTTP, the IDM3G
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is efficient in term of the number of messages exchanged in
the path, which is lower compared to both protocols [183]
[184], but the location privacy is not considered. Similar to
the IDM3G protocol, Dimitriadis and Shaikh (2007) [112]
proposed a protocol, called BIO3G, for establishing secure
and privacy friendly biometric authentication in 3G mobile
environments. The BIO3G protocol cannot resist against the
DoS attacks and the location and identity privacy are not
considered compared to the IDM3G protocol [111]. He et
al. [74] proposed three categories of authentication scenarios
for the 4G system. The main idea of [74] is the use of Self-
Certified Public-Key, which need not be accompanied by a
separate digital certificate. The advantage of the protocol [74]
is that it considers the identity privacy, but its disadvantage is
the location privacy of mobile users. The following question
is: Is it necessary to preserve the location privacy in future
5G networks? According to Lu et al. [78], ensuring location
privacy in a cellular network is an effort to prevent any
other party from learning the mobile users current and past
locations. The recent idea in [185] and [186] can be applied
for privacy preserving the social application under 4G/5G
communications.
Location privacy is one of the most important models for
privacy, as discussed in our previous surveys in [9] [187]. To
the best of our knowledge, Lu et al. [78] proposed the first
study that deals with the mutual authentication with location
privacy. Specifically, the authors proposed a novel mutual au-
thentication protocol with provable link-layer location privacy.
With the help of the Preset in Idle technique, the protocol
[78] is efficient in terms of the packet delay time and the total
packet time cost compared with the protocol [188]. On the
other hand, mutual authentication with identity privacy can
also be preserved using the identity management mechanism
proposed by Abdelkader et al. [82]. The authors proposed
an advanced Identity Management scheme, called AIM, in
order to guarantee mutual authentication, privacy, and tracking
avoidance for 4G networks. According to Saxena et al. [69],
the EPS-AKA protocol of the LTE network does not support
Internet of Things (IoT). Specifically, the authors proposed an
authentication protocol for an IoT-Enabled LTE Network that
is entirely based on the symmetric key cryptosystem.
For the security of future fifth generation telecommuni-
cations, a service provider will need to apply the managed
security services (MSS) as network security services. Accord-
ing to Ulltveit-Moe et al. [114], the security services may be
required for all mobile terminals such as antivirus, firewalls,
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), integrity checking and
security profiles. Specifically, the authors proposed a location-
aware mobile intrusion prevention system with enhanced
privacy, named mIPS, which is integrated into MSS. The
mIPS system can preserve the personal privacy profile, but he
needs to be evaluated in the future for 5G communications.
Using identification parameters, including, the International
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) and the Radio Network
Temporary Identities (RNTI), Jang et al. [95] proposed an
authentication protocol to safely transmit identification param-
eters in different cases of the initial attach under 4G mobile
communications.
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Fig. 8. Classification of RFID authentication protocols with RFID privacy
According to Madueno et al. [189], the LTE network is a
promising solution for cost-efficient connectivity of the smart
grid monitoring equipment. To ensure the security of this
equipment, Haddad et al. [66] proposed a privacy-preserving
scheme to secure the communications of an automatic me-
tering infrastructure via LTE-A networks. To share keys, the
scheme [66] uses a key agreement protocol between the smart
meters, the utility company, and the LTE network. The scheme
[66] cannot only achieve the mutual authentication, key agree-
ment, and key evolution but also can preserve the confidential-
ity/data integrity and authenticity. Recently, Mahmoud et al.
[109] proposed a privacy preserving power injection querying
scheme over LTE cellular networks, to solve the problem
of privacy exposure of storage unit owners. Therefore, the
4G/5G communications can be used by the traffic information
systems [101]. Gisdakis et al. [101] addressed the security
and privacy protection aspects of smartphone-based traffic
information systems. More specifically, the authors proposed
a privacy-preserving system using the architecture presented
in [190]. This system is based on three main phases, namely,
1) System initialization, 2) Device authentication and report
submission, and 3) Device eviction. In addition, the system
[101] can provide the anonymity and the report unlinkability.
C. RFID authentication with privacy
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems are low cost
and convenience in identifying an object without physical
contact, which consists of radio frequency (RF) tags, or
transponders, and RF tag readers, or transceivers. According
to Sun and Ting [117], RF technology can provide three
functions: item awareness, information searching, and quality
control. In addition, an RFID application contains three basic
roles: 1) tag, 2) reader, and 3) back-end database [191]. As
presented in Fig. 8, RFID authentication protocols with RFID
privac1) Generation-2 Protocol, e.g., the Gen2 protocol in
[192], 2) CRC-Based Protocol, e.g., the SASI protocol in
[167], 3) Minimalist Cryptography, e.g., the protocol in [193],
4) Protocol with Substring Function, e.g., the protocols in
[194] and [195], and 5) ECC-Based Protocol, e.g., the protocol
in [167]. Similair to Sun and Ting [117], Dubrova et al. [105]
proposed a message authentication scheme based on Cyclic
Redundancy Check (CRC) codes for 5G Mobile Technology.
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Chien [167] proposed an ultralightweight RFID authenti-
cation protocol, called SASI, to providing strong authentica-
tion and integrity protection. The SASI protocol uses only
simple bit-wise operations on the tag. Chien and Chen [113]
addressed the weaknesses of two schemes [196] [192] and
proposed a mutual authentication scheme for GEN-2 RFID.
The scheme [113] can preserve the privacy and resist against
DOS attack compared to both schemes [196] [192]. Liu
and Bailey proposed an another interesting protocol that can
achieve both privacy and authentication in [77]. Specifically,
the authors proposed a privacy and authentication protocol for
passive RFID tags, called PAP. The PAP protocol is based on
four main phases, namely, In-store, Checkout, Out-store, and
Return. PAP can resist against replay attack, but vulnerable
to some attacks such as desynchronization attack and tracing
attack. The following question is: Is it really necessary to
detect the tracing attack? According to Sun and Ting [117],
with tracing attack, an adversary have both a "malicious active
reader" and several "malicious passive" loggers. The authors
proposed a solution, called Gen2+, for RFID application with
focusing on the protection of UltraHigh Frequency (UHF)
passive tags from malicious readers. The Gen2+scheme can
detect the tracing attack, also efficient in terms of the number
of rounds required, and the period of key update compared to
three schemes [167], [192], and [194].
To achieve RFID authentication with
anonymity/untraceability, and even availability, Chien
and Laih [119] proposed a RFID authentication protocol
based on Error Correction Codes (ECC) [197]. The protocol
[119] can achieve mutual authentication between the tags
and the reader based on the successful verification of the
PRNG function applied on the secret key. The protocol [119]
is efficient in term of computation complexity compared to
the protocol LMAP [198]. According to Kulseng et al. [122],
the lightweight solution such as LMAP [198] has been either
broken or weakened. In fact, the authors in [122] proposed
a protocol in which only the authenticated readers and tags
can successfully communicate with each other. Then, they
designed protocols that achieve secure ownership transfer
in three-party and two party low-cost RFID systems, but
theses protocols need to be examined using real hardware.
Especially for detection of man-in-the-middle attack, Li et
al. [64] proposed an authentication protocol, named LCMQ,
which is proved secure in a general man-in-the-middle model.
The LCMQ protocol can achieve RFID authentication and
also efficient in terms of the tag’s computation, storage, and
communication costs compared with traditional cryptographic
primitives such as RSA, DSA, and SHA.
Furthermore, Zhou et al. [83] proposed a lightweight anti-
desynchronization RFID authentication protocol, which is suit-
able for the low-cost RFID environment. Based on the idea of
Index-pseudonym, the protocol [83] cannot only ensure the pri-
vacy of the tag, but also provide the forward security, location
privacy, integrity, and tag anonymity. The strong advantage of
the protocol [83] is in desynchronization resistance compared
to the protocol [122]. By using a modified EAP-AKA protocol
[199] for authentication with the access network, Sharma and
Leung [90] proposed a robust one-pass IMS authentication
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Fig. 9. Classification of methods based on EAP authentication framework
mechanism in LTE-fem to cell heterogeneous networks. The
mechanism is 50 percent improvement over the existing multi-
pass authentication scheme published before 2012. Liao and
Hsiao [98] proposed a secure ECC-based RFID authentication
scheme integrated with ID-verifier transfer protocol, which is
efficient in terms of computational cost and communication
overhead compared to the scheme of Tuyls et al. [200].
To preserve the authentication for IoT in 5G. Fan et al.
[161] proposed a lightweight RFID mutual authentication
protocol with cache in the reader, named LRMAPC. Using
an ultralightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol with
cache in the reader, the LRMAPC protocol can achieve mutual
authentication and provide forward security. Recently, Sun
et al. [201] formulated secure and privacy preserving object
finding via mobile crowdsourcing. Then, they proposed a
scheme, called SecureFind. Based on the initial object-finding
request, the SecureFind scheme can obtain the information the
service provider. Based on the vulnerability of two published
protocols RRAP [202] and RCIA [203], Luo et al. [204] pro-
posed recently a new ultra-lightweight mutual authentication
protocol, which doesn’t use any unbalanced operations like
OR and AND.
D. Deniable authentication with privacy
The deniable authentication differs from traditional authen-
tication in a way that the Receiver cannot convince a third
party [205]. Therefore, Lee et al. [72] proposed a protocol
based on the non-interactive manner in order to achieve
deniable authentication. Based on the shared session secret
and the ElGamal signature scheme [206], the protocol [72]
does not only consider the security issues proposed in [207],
including forgery attack, impersonation attack, deniability,
and completeness but can also sustain the security when the
session secret has already been compromised. Therefore, the
use of message authentication codes (MACs) [132] between
two parties in cellular networks can achieving the deniable
authentication.
To providing a lower degree of scalability and security,
Bersani and Tschofenig [73] defined an experimental proto-
col for the Internet community, called EAP-PSK, under the
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RFC 4764. The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
is an authentication frequently used in wireless networks
that defined in RFC 3748 [208], RFC 2284 [209], and was
updated by RFC 5247 [210]. As detailed in Fig. 9, there are
many EAP authentication framework-based methods, which
published as RFCs [211] as Internet Standards. However, Chen
et al. [76] proposed two strong devices and user authentication
schemes for Wi-Fi and WiMAX inter-networked wireless
cities. The idea of [76] is based on the modified Transport
Layer Security (TLS) protocol [212], which leverage Trusted
Platform Module (TPM) technologies [213]. The work [76]
does not consider the identity and location privacy. Besides,
the following question is: can we use the EAP to achieve
the identity privacy? According to Pereniguez et al. [121],
if the authentication mechanism does not have an adequate
level of privacy, the identity and location can be revealed.
Pereniguez et al. [121] proposed a privacy-enhanced fast re-
authentication, named 3PFH, for EAP-based 4G of mobile
communications. The main idea of 3PFH is defined by a multi-
layered pseudonym architecture to achieve user anonymity and
untraceability. The 3PFH is applicable when the handoff takes
place between different network operators. In addition, Arul
et al. [214] proposed a caching mechanism, called UPP-KC,
where the keys are cached only along a predicted path for
broadband wireless networks.
E. Authentication with mutual anonymity
Anonymity is an important security aspect of cellular com-
munications, since it protects the privacy of the users, as
discussed in our previous survey in [9]. Lu et al. [75] pro-
posed an anonymous zero-knowledge authentication protocol,
called PT, for Peer-to-peer (P2P) systems. We note here that
we have selected this protocol because it can apply as an
authentication protocol in 4G and 5G cellular communications.
Besides, the PT protocol can support trust management in
anonymous environments and scalable in both static and
dynamic environments. To provide integrity to data exchanges
after authentication, the PT protocol uses a Diffie-Hellman
Key Exchange protocol into the authentication procedure to
generate a session key.
To achieving the privacy preserving context transfer for 4G
networks, Terzis et al. (2011) [84] proposed four privacy pre-
serving schemes for Context transfer protocol (CXTP) [215].
These schemes are efficient in terms of application handoff
service time compared to CXTP, while at the same time
guarantee the privacy of the end-user. To verify the identity of
a user or a host over 4G network, the network authentication
protocol, called Kerberos, can be used. The Kerberos protocol
is proposed under IETF RFC 4120 [216], where he composed
with several entities, including, 1) The client (C) with its
own secret key, 2) The server (S) with its secret key, 3)
Ticket-granting service, and 4) Key distribution center. As
presented in Fig. 10, the Kerberos protocol provides several
authentication models, including, 1) More efficient authenti-
cation to servers, 2) Interoperability, 3) Single authentication,
4) Delegated authentication, and 5) Mutual authentication.
However, According to Pereniguez et al. [120], the Kerberos
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Fig. 10. Different models offered by the Kerberos protocol
protocol suffers from two issues, namely, user anonymity and
service access untraceability. The authors proposed a two-
level privacy architecture, named PrivaKERB, to preserves the
privacy of the user during activity with Kerberos. Based on
two different levels of privacy: level 1, which provides user
anonymity through pseudonyms, and level 2 where, apart from
user anonymity, service access untraceability is assured. In
addition, PrivaKERB is efficient in terms of service times,
resource and network utilization compared to the standard
Kerberos protocol [216].
Recently, Zhang et al. [71] proposed a secure data sharing
strategy for Device-to-Device (D2D) in 4G LTE-advanced
network, called SeDS. To ensures data confidentiality, in-
tegrity, non-repudiation, and system availability, the SeDS
strategy uses the digital signature and symmetric encryption.
In addition, the SeDS strategy is efficient in terms of com-
putational overhead, communication overhead and availability
in a practical D2D communication environment. The idea of
Hashem Eiza et al. [166] can be applied for cloud-assisted
video reporting service in 5G enabled vehicular networks.
F. Authentication and key agreement with privacy
The Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol is
a challenge-response based mechanism that uses symmetric
cryptography. The Universal Mobile Telecommunication Sys-
tem (UMTS) has adopted the AKA protocol of 3GPP, known
as a standard of 3G with RFC 3310. Therefore, Deng et al.
[115] proposed an improved authentication and key agreement
protocol based on public key cryptosystem. The protocol [115]
is vulnerable to some attacks, such as replay attack, man-in-
the-middle attack, and DoS attack. The following question is:
Is it really necessary to hiding communication content from the
external adversary under AKA protocol? Hamandi et al. [163]
proposed a hybrid scheme based on modifications to the LTE-
AKA scheme, which employs both symmetric and asymmetric
key encryption in order to detect and avoid both insider and
outsider attacks. Using an efficient access-policy updating
method, Li et al. [70] proposed a group-based AKA protocol,
called GR-AKA. The GR-AKA can reduce the communication
overhead and alleviates the burden between machine type com-
munication devices, but the known-key secrecy and the perfect
forward secrecy are not considered compared to the scheme
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[100]. To avoid the signal congestion in 3GPP networks, Yao
et al. [67] proposed a group-based authentication for machine-
to-machine (M2M), which is efficient in term of bandwidth
consumption.
According to Zhu et al. [80], the AKA protocol can easily
be extended to provide revocable privacy by adopting the
fair blind signature technique [127]. Specifically, Zhu et al.
[80] proposed an anonymous authenticated key agreement
protocol, called PPAB, to achieve scalable, authentication and
billing in the context of interdomain roaming in the wireless
metropolitan area sharing networks (WMSNs). The PPAB
protocol considers five levels of privacy protection, namely,
1) content privacy, 2) external privacy, 3) internal privacy
I, 4) internal privacy II, and 5) internal privacy III. The
content privacy is hiding communication content from the
external adversary. The external privacy is hiding identity
information of mobile users from the external adversary. The
internal privacy I is hiding identity information of mobile
users from the wireless Internet service providers. The in-
ternal privacy II is hiding identity information of mobile
users from the roaming broker. The internal privacy III is
hiding identity information of mobile users from adversary
for each handoff event [80]. Besides, PPAB is efficient in
term of energy consumption compared to the scheme [128],
but the deniability and completeness are not considered. To
the best of our knowledge, the work of Zhu et al. [80] is the
first study on the issues of localized authentication, billing,
and privacy in the context of interdomain roaming in the
WMSNs. To achieve the protection of user privacy, anonymity
and untraceability for roaming network, Zhang et al. [103]
proposed a privacy-preserving authentication scheme based on
elliptic curve cryptography.
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is proposed by IETF
under RFC 3261 in full and a number of extension RFCs
including RFC 6665 (event notification) and RFC 3262 (re-
liable provisional responses). The SIP protocol is an IP-
based telephony protocol for multimedia telecommunications
(sound, image, etc.) in 3G mobile networks and over Internet
Protocol (IP) networks. According to Wu et al. [81], the SIP
protocol does not include any specific security mechanisms.
Specifically, Wu et al. [81] proposed a provably secure authen-
tication and key agreement protocol for SIP using elliptic curve
cryptography, called NAKE, in order to achieving the perfect
forward secrecy. The NAKE protocol is preferable in the
applications that require low memory and rapid transactions.
However, the disadvantage of the NAKE protocol is that it
does not preserve the location privacy compared to the scheme
[80]. To provide the location and identity privacy, Karopoulos
et al. (2011) [116] proposed two solutions in SIP, where the
first the ID of the caller is protected while in the second both
IDs of the caller and the callee are protected. Both solutions
consider the identity privacy and are efficient in term of mean
server response delays compared to standard SIP, but the key
agreement is not considered.
To improve the security of both schemes, including, Wu
et al.’s scheme [217] and Yoon et al.’s scheme [218], He
[93] proposed a new user authentication and key agreement
protocol using bilinear pairings for mobile client–server envi-
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Fig. 11. Classification of three-factor authentication schemes with privacy
ronment. The idea of [93] is based on the bilinear pairing under
the computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) and collision attack
assumption and in the random oracle model. The scheme [93]
can achieve the client-to-server authentication, the server-to-
client authentication and key agreement under the random
oracle model, but the privacy is not considered compared
to the scheme [88]. However, using a temporary confidential
channel, Chen et al. [62] designed three type of authentication,
including, 1) Bipartite authentication protocol, 2) Tripartite
authentication protocol, and 3) Multipartite transitive authen-
tication.
Based on three main categories of auxiliary channels, in-
cluding, input, transfer, and verification, Mayrhofer et al. [63]
proposed a unified auxiliary channel authentication protocol,
named UACAP, which releases a specific implementation in
the form of the Open-source Ubiquitous Authentication Toolkit
(OpenUAT) [158]. Using two main phases, namely, 1) Diffie-
Hellman key exchange with precommitment and 2) Out-of-
band key verification, the UACAP protocol can exploit any
combination of security guarantees from arbitrary auxiliary
channels. Recently, Ramadan et al. [110] proposed a user-to-
user mutual authentication and key agreement scheme, which
is more compatible with the LTE security architecture. The
scheme [110] is based on four phases, namely, 1) Setup and
key generation, 2) Authentication between the users and the
mobility management entity, 3) User-to-User authentication,
and 4) Establish a shared secret key.
G. Three-factor authentication with privacy
The three-factor authentication schemes with privacy can
mainly be classified into three categories: 1) Smart cards-based
protocol, 2) Passwords-based protocol, and 3) Biometrics-
based protocol, as presented in Fig. 11. The following question
is: can we use the three factors together? According to Fan and
Lin [79], this three different data types can be used together
in an authentication protocol, where smart cards show what
you have, passwords represent what you know, and biometrics
mean what you are. Specifically, the authors proposed a truly
three-factor authentication scheme to achieving the strong bio-
metrics privacy. Based on the login and authentication phase,
the server accepts only if each factor (password, smart card,
and biometric data) passes the authentication. The protocol
[79] is efficient in term of low computation for smart cards
17
compared to three-factor authentication schemes in [219] and
[220]. Therefore, according to Blasco et al. [221], the biomet-
ric systems can mainly be classified into three categories: 1)
Traditional Biometric Systems (e.g., Windows Hello [222]),
2) Wearable biometric systems (e.g., Using a smartphone),
and 3) Hybrid biometric systems (e.g., Hybrid systems arises
in telecare services [223]). For more details in the field of
wearable biometrics and in the security and privacy issues in
implantable medical devices, we refer the reader to the both
recent surveys [221] and [224].
For security of 4G and 5G networks using Biometric-based
identification, it is required that the client does not learn
anything on the database. Therefore, according to Barni et
al. [118], the fingerprint is likely to be used in applications
that need higher reliability. Specifically, the authors proposed
a privacy-preserving system for fingerprint-based authentica-
tion. Based on the Fingercode representation introduced in
[225], the identification protocol [118] is efficient in term
of bandwidth usage compared to both schemes Erkin et al.
[226] and Sadeghi et al. [227]. Especially for multiserver
environment, He and Wang [106] proposed a biometrics-based
authentication scheme, which is overcome the weaknesses in
Yoon and Yoo’s scheme [228] and Kim et al.’s scheme [229].
The password-based-authentication protocols are a reliable
solution to provide identity protection and satisfy strong
mutual authentication in 4G and 5G networks. Moreover,
Sood et al. [85] presented a cryptanalysis of the Hsiang and
Shih protocol [230] in order to propose a secure dynamic
identity-based authentication protocol for multi-server archi-
tecture. The protocol [85] is efficient in term of computation
complexity compared to related smart card based multi-server
authentication protocols [230] [231]. Similar to [85], Lee et al.
[86] presented a cryptanalysis of Hsiang et al. scheme [230]
where the authors have found that Hsiang et al. scheme is
still vulnerable to a masquerade attack, server-spoofing attack,
and is not easily reparable. Then, the authors [86] proposed
a scheme to solve these weaknesses. In addition, Lee et al.
scheme [86] is efficient in term of communication cost of
the login and verification phase compared to three schemes,
namely, Hsiang et al. scheme [230], Liao-Wang scheme [231],
and Chang-Lee scheme [232]. Li et al. [91] out that the
protocol [85] is still not secure. Based on the cryptanalysis
of the protocol [85], the authors [86] proposed a security dy-
namic identity-based authentication protocol for multi-server
architecture. The protocol [91] provide the user’s anonymity,
proper mutual authentication, and session key agreement. In
addition, the protocol [91] is efficient in terms of computa-
tional complexity compared with some related dynamic ID
based multi-server authentication protocols, including, [85],
[230], and [231]. Similar to [62], Liu and Liang [94] proposed
a hierarchical identity-based access authentication protocol,
named HA-HIBS-VN, which can be applied for 4G and 5G
cellular networks. The HA-HIBS-VN protocol [94] can pro-
vide the private key privacy and signature unforgeability. By
combining the peer group tree (PGT), identity-based signature,
and designed mobile vector network protocol (MVNP), the
HA-HIBS-VN protocol [94] is efficient in term of handover
delays compared with the protocol in [233].
Previous works in this area, i.e., password-based-
authentication, have come short of providing solutions to
detecting password reuse attacks. Moreover, Sun et al. [92]
proposed the first user authentication protocol to prevent
password stealing (i.e., phishing, keylogger, and malware) and
password reuse attacks simultaneously. The authors proposed
a user authentication, called oPass, to thwart this both attacks.
The idea of oPass is to adopt one-time passwords, which
they expired when the user completes the current session.
Based on two main processes, including, 1) Login phase and
2) Recovery phase, the oPass can protect the information on
the cellphone from a thief. Hence, the oPass protocol can be
applied for 4G and 5G cellular networks. To provide privacy-
preserving and secure roaming service for 4G and 5G cellular
networks, Wang et al. [96] revisited the privacy-preserving
two-factor authentication scheme presented by Li et al. in
[168], which they showed that the scheme [234] suffers from
offline password guessing attack. The study of Wang et al.
[96] can withstand offline password guessing attack even if
the victim’s smart card is lost. As an additional benefit, the
Wang et al. scheme [96] is efficient in term of computation
cost on user side compared to fives schemes Li et al. [168],
Isawa-Morii [169], He et al. [170], Zhou-Xu [171], and Xu et
al. [172]. To overcome the weaknesses of Das scheme [235],
Li et al. [100] a three-factor remote user authentication and
key agreement scheme using biometrics. Based on discrete
logarithm problem [236], the Li et al. scheme [100] can
ensure the known-key secrecy and provide the perfect forward
secrecy.
Similar to [96], Chen et al. (2014) [65] proposed an
improved smart-card-based password authentication and key
agreement scheme. Based on the review of the Xu et al.
scheme [237] and Sood et al. scheme [238], the scheme
[65] can achieve mutual authentication and guarantees forward
secrecy. In addition, the scheme [65] is efficient in term of
computation cost on server side compared to three schemes Xu
et al. [237] Sood et al. [238], and Song [239]. Therefore, if the
authentication stored in the memory device is exposed, Jiang
et al. pointed out that the scheme [65] suffers from offline
password guessing attacks.
Based on the cryptanalysis of two schemes of Chen et
al. [85] and Wen–Li [240], Ma et al. [97] proposed three
principles designing more robust schemes in the future, which
can be applied for 4G and 5G cellular networks. To overcome
the weaknesses of Chang et al.’s scheme [241], Kumari et al.
[99] proposed an improved user authentication scheme with
session key agreement facility. Compared to the Chang et
al.’s scheme [241], the Kumari et al.’ scheme [99] cannot
only provide forward secrecy, but the user is anonymous and
untraceable. To overcome the weaknesses of Kumari et al.’s
scheme [242], Chaudhry et al. [102] proposed an enhanced
remote user authentication scheme, which can ensures privacy
and anonymity.
VI. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
As shown in Fig. 12, authentication and privacy-preserving
schemes for 4G and 5G cellular networks focus on four
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authentication models, namely, proper mutual authentication,
session key agreement, RFID authentication, and handover
authentication. When security analysis techniques are used, the
surveyed schemes use AVISPA tool, ProVerif, Game theory,
and GNY logic, as shown in Fig.13 . In addition, the surveyed
schemes focus on different areas of privacy models, namely,
identity privacy, RFID privacy, untraceability, anonymity, and
location privacy, as shown in Fig.14. To complete our overview
of authentication and privacy-preserving schemes for 4G and
5G cellular networks, open directions for future research are
described below.
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A. Privacy preservation for Fog paradigm-based 5G radio
access network
To meet the requirements of mission-critical applications in
5G radio access network (RAN), two system design paradigms
can be used, including, cloud and fog. Recently, Ku et al. [243]
proposed a Fog-cloud integrated RAN architecture, named F-
RAN. To integrate the computing functionality to 5G cellular
networks, F-RAN adopts two approaches, including, loosely-
coupled and tightly-coupled. However, several attacks against
privacy can be launched, such as man-in-the-middle attack and
replay attack, which can reveal the location and identity of Fog
nodes in F-RAN architecture. How to provide the location
and identity privacy for Fog paradigm-based 5G radio access
network? Hence, privacy preservation for Fog paradigm-based
5G radio access network should be exploited in the future.
B. Authentication for 5G small cell-based smart grids
The smart grid deployment requires a faster communication
medium in the long run, which can be achieved by the 5G
wireless from data and control plane isolation. With evolved
multimedia broadcast and multicast communication, between
aggregators (small cells) and smart grid consumers, Saxena
et al. [244] introduced a planning of 5G small cells, for
optimal demand response in smart grids. This idea can reduce
energy production cost by 30%, but this is calculated without
taking in mind possible network attacks that also affect energy
consumption. Even though numerous authentication schemes
have been designed in recent years to protect communication
in smart grids but these schemes are not reliable to detect and
prevent common attacks as well as reducing energy production
cost for 5G small cell-based smart grids. Therefore, how do
we reduce the cost of energy under network attacks? Hence,
authentication for 5G small cell-based smart grids is another
possible future direction.
C. Privacy preservation for SDN/NFV-based architecture in
5G scenarios
Software Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Function
Virtualization (NFV) technologies considered as key drivers to
paving the way towards the 5G era, as discussed in a recent
survey published in 2017 [245]. Specifically, Nguyen et al.
reviews the state of the art of SDN/NFV-based mobile packet
core network architectures, none of them carries study for the
privacy preservation. A possible research direction in this topic
could be related to privacy preservation for SDN/NFV-based
architecture in 5G scenarios such as location privacy, identity
privacy, anonymity, etc. Last but not least, guaranteeing the
authentication between the mobile users and devices are also
important factors when realizing the network sharing based on
SDN/NFV in 5G scenarios.
D. Dataset for intrusion detection in 5G scenarios
As we have seen in subsection III-B, data mining and ma-
chine learning methods are used to help discover, determine,
and identify unauthorized use and destruction of information
systems, such as 4G and 5G cellular networks [246]. Buczak
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and Guven [246] have found that the most intrusion detection
systems used the DARPA 1998, DARPA 1999, DARPA 2000,
or KDD 1999 data sets. Therefore, the question we ask here is:
Can these data sets be used in 5G scenarios? In other words,
the threat models discussed in subsection III-A are simulated
in these data sets? We believe that further research is needed
to develop a new data set to build a network intrusion detector
under 5G environment.
E. Privacy preserving schemes for UAV systems in 5G hetero-
geneous communication environment
In a connected society, i.e., IoT, the intelligent deployment
of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAVs) in 5G heterogeneous
communication environment will play a major role in improv-
ing peoples’ lives. With the limitation of wireless communi-
cation and computing capability of drones, the application of
UAV is becoming more and more complicated, especially for
security and privacy issues. In a work published in 2017, He
et al. [247] categorized threat models on the drone-assisted
public safety network, in four categories, namely, attacks on
confidentiality, attacks on integrity, attacks on availability, and
attacks on authenticity. One possible future direction is to
develop a privacy preserving schemes for UAV systems in 5G
heterogeneous communication environment.
F. Authentication and privacy-preserving schemes for 5G
small cell-based vehicular crowdsensing
Vehicular crowdsensing entails serious security and privacy
issues, where it is important to protect user identity, location
privacy, among others. Using Fog computing, Basudan et al.
[248] proposed a new idea for privacy preserving for vehicular
crowdsensing. Specifically, this idea introduced a certificate-
less aggregate signcryption scheme, named CLASC, which is
highly efficient in term of low communication overhead and
fast verification. Moreover, the system model considers that the
road surface condition monitoring system comprises a control
center, vehicles, smart devices, roadside units, and cloud
servers. Since we are moving to the 5G communications, a new
emerging paradigm will appear, named 5G small cell-based
vehicular crowdsensing, in order to meet the requirements for
new applications in vehicular ad hoc networks such as park-
ing navigation, road surface monitoring, and traffic collision
reconstruction. The future works addressing the limitations of
authentication and privacy-preserving schemes for vehicular
crowdsensing will have an important contribution for 5G small
cell-based vehicular crowdsensing.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED
In this article, we surveyed the state-of-the-art of authenti-
cation and privacy-preserving schemes for 4G and 5G cellular
networks. Through an extensive research and analysis that
was conducted, we were able to classify the threat models in
cellular networks into attacks against privacy, attacks against
integrity, attacks against availability, and attacks against au-
thentication. In addition, we were able to classify the counter-
measures into cryptography methods, humans factors, and in-
trusion detection methods. For the cryptographic methods, the
surveyed schemes use three types of cryptographic, including,
public-key cryptography, symmetric-key cryptography, and
unkeyed cryptography. To ensure authentication, the surveyed
schemes use three factors, including, what you know (e.g.,
passwords), what you have (e.g., smart cards), and 3) who
are you (e.g., biometrics). For intrusion detection methods,
the surveyed schemes use three systems, including, signature-
based system, anomaly-based system, and hybrid IDS.
From security analysis point, there are twelve informal and
formal security analysis techniques used in authentication and
privacy preserving schemes for 4G and 5G cellular networks,
namely, zero-knowledge proof, mathematical difficulties, GNY
logic, CK security model, random oracle model, game theory,
probabilistic functions, BAN logic, AVISPA tool, Open-source
MIT Kerberos, OpenUAT, and ProVerif. We were able to
classify these techniques in two classes, including, without
an implementation tool and with an implementation tool.
Based on the categorization of authentication and privacy
models, we were able to classify the surveyed schemes in
seven types, including, handover authentication with privacy,
mutual authentication with privacy, RFID authentication with
privacy, deniable authentication with privacy, authentication
with mutual anonymity, authentication and key agreement with
privacy, and three-factor authentication with privacy.
Based on the vision for the next generation of connectivity,
we proposed six open directions for future research about
authentication and privacy-preserving schemes, namely, Fog
paradigm-based 5G radio access network, 5G small cell-based
smart grids, SDN/NFV-based architecture in 5G scenarios,
dataset for intrusion detection in 5G scenarios, UAV systems
in 5G environment, and 5G small cell-based vehicular crowd-
sensing.
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